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EPISTEMIC INJUSTICE IN HEALTHCARE ENCOUNTERS:  
EVIDENCE FROM CHRONIC FATIGUE SYNDROME 
 
ABSTRACT 
Chronic fatigue syndrome or myalgic encephalomyelitis (hereafter, CFS/ME) remains 
a controversial illness category. This paper surveys the state of knowledge and 
attitudes about this illness and proposes that epistemic concerns about the testimonial 
credibility of patients can be articulated using Miranda Fricker’s concept of epistemic 
injustice. While there is consensus within mainstream medical guidelines that there is 
no known cause of CFS/ME, there is continued debate about how best to conceive of 
CFS/ME, including disagreement about how to interpret clinical studies of treatments. 
Against this background, robust qualitative and quantitative research from a range of 
countries has found that many doctors (and medical students) display uncertainty 
about whether CFS/ME is real, which may result in delays in diagnosis and treatment 
for patients. Strikingly, qualitative research evinces that patients with CFS/ME often 
experience suspicion by health professionals, and many patients vocally oppose the 
effectiveness, and the conceptualization, of their illness as psychologically treatable. 
We address the intersection of these issues and healthcare ethics, and claim that this 
state of affairs can be explained as a case of epistemic injustice (2007). We find 
evidence that healthcare consultations are fora where patients with CFS/ME may be 
particularly vulnerable to epistemic injustice. We argue that the (often unintentional) 
marginalization of many patients is a professional failure that may lead to further 
ethical and practical consequences both for progressive research into CFS/ME, and 
for ethical care and delivery of current treatments among individuals suffering from 
this debilitating illness. 
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1. INTRODUCTION  
Chronic fatigue syndrome (CFS/ME)i, also known as myalgic encephalomyelitis 
(ME), is a contested illness domain: even how we label the disorder is disputed by 
clinicians, diagnosticians and patient groups.1 During the 1980s and 1990s the media 
coined the term “Yuppie Flu”, characterizing sufferers as ‘stressed out professionals’ 
unable to cope with the fast pace of life. However, CFS/ME is more thoroughly 
understood to be a disabling, debilitating condition of prolonged unexplained fatigue 
lasting 6 months or longer, together with other symptoms, such as post-exertional 
malaise, cognitive problems and pain;2 many persons with CFS/ME become 
homebound and bedbound. Many patients are vulnerable to anxiety and 
depression:ii,3,4 indeed, there is evidence that CFS/ME impinges on quality of life to a 
greater extent than other chronic illnesses including cancer.5 Evidence also shows that 
CFS/ME does not respect socioeconomic status (undermining the ‘yuppie flu’ epithet) 
with evidence that the condition is more common among females than males.6 Current 
estimates indicate that around 2.5 million people suffer from CFS/ME in the USA, 
with around 250,000 sufferers in the UK.7  
 Today, CFS/ME is a condition that mainstream medical science has yet to 
explain in terms of aetiology or pathophysiology. While there is consensus that 
CFS/ME is a chronic illness, controversy exists over how to conceive of the illness 
and how to interpret the evidence-base for treatments. Studies report that many 
                                                        
i In this paper, we acknowledge that there is no uncontroversial name for the illness but in the 
interests of consistency, we refer to the illness as chronic fatigue syndrome or ‘CFS/ME’. 
ii A recent study in The Lancet Psychiatry reported that the suicide rate among individuals with 
CFS/ME in the UK is six times greater than in the general population [Roberts E, Wessely S, Chalder T, 
Chang, C-K, Hotopf, M. (2016). Mortality of people with chronic fatigue syndrome: A retrospective 
cohort study in England and Wales from the South London and Maudsley NHS Foundation Trust 
Biomedical Research Centre (SLaM BRC) Clinical Record Interactive Search (CRIS) Register, The Lancet, 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/s1040-6736(15)01223-4.] 
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sufferers report negative encounters with doctors with significant numbers of patients 
feeling dissatisfied, disbelieved and distressed.8  
We suggest that the complaint that health care professionals fail to take 
seriously these patient reports amounts to an epistemic concern that can be brought to 
light most effectively using Miranda Fricker’s concept of epistemic injustice. Fricker 
(2007) has argued that epistemology is deeply entwined with ethics.9 For Fricker, the 
sharing and production of knowledge is a valued good: as such, inequalities in 
legitimate access to such knowledge and to participation in knowledge-formation 
constitute an ethical wrong leading to primary and secondary harms. Fricker classifies 
these wrongs and harms as ‘epistemic injustice’. Developing its application, Havi 
Carel and Ian Kidd have recently argued that Fricker’s framework provides a fruitful 
perspective for analyzing the distinctive epistemic injustice that may arise within the 
healthcare arena, and in particular in healthcare consultations, medical education, and 
policy-making.10,11 This paper applies this theoretical framework to the case of 
CFS/ME and examines the ethical repercussions of the deep differences between lay 
and health professional perspectives on this illness. 
 In this paper we suggest that there is empirical evidence to substantiate the 
claim that CFS/ME patients are indeed being negatively stereotyped in ways that 
unfairly deflate their credibility and that they also suffer disadvantage due to lack of 
shared hermeneutical resources through which to frame and interpret their 
experiences. Importantly, such epistemic injustice, when playing itself out in the 
health care arena, has significant consequences for patient care, as we argue in 
Section 5. We claim that an analysis of empirical studies of patient and health 
professional attitudes is required in order to reveal epistemic injustice. This epistemic 
injustice, we argue, is also bound with other forms of injustice in the health care arena, 
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and hence uncovering it has broader significance to our understanding of health care, 
patienthood and the relationships, epistemic and otherwise, between patient and 
health care professionals. The injustices we identify and discuss in the paper are 
epistemically and ethically bad, but they are also clinically bad in ways that are 
important to consider. 
 The structure of the paper is as follows. We begin with an overview of the 
state of knowledge of CFS/ME in medicine, encompassing international mainstream 
medical consensus about the explanatory gap with respect to the causes of CFS/ME, 
as well as prominent clinical disagreements about the value of treatments. Following 
this, we outline Fricker’s account of epistemic injustice which describes how social 
practices entangle epistemic and ethical dimensions. In this section we define 
Fricker’s key concepts of testimonial injustice and hermeneutical injustice which – as 
Fricker has argued – may infringe on medical professionalism and lead to patient 
harm.9 More specifically, we suggest that the aetiological and nosological uncertainty 
of CFS/ME arguably affects healthcare professionals’ tacit judgments of the 
testimonies of those reporting CFS/ME symptoms. Our claim is that in this case an 
uncertainty about the condition translates into uncertainty about its sufferers. This, we 
argue, is where the epistemic injustice arises in the case of CFS/ME.  
It is also important to emphasize from the outset that testimonial and 
hermeneutical practices (which can be characterized roughly as giving information to 
others and making sense of one’s experiences) are foundational social-epistemic 
practices, both within medical practice and beyond it. Thus a concern about epistemic 
injustice is not merely a narrow medical or bioethical concern, but a broad and 
pervasive problem that has particular ethical consequences, in terms of suffering, 
health inequality and medical treatment, when it plays itself out in the health care 
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arena (for a full discussion of epistemic injustice in health care see Carel & Kidd; 
Kidd & Carel).  
 Next, we present qualitative and quantitative studies of patient and doctor 
attitudes to CFS/ME (including respective experiences of CFS/ME and understanding 
of the condition). We find that a range of evidence appears to corroborate the 
possibility of recurrent testimonial and hermeneutical injustice among CFS/ME 
patients in some healthcare encounters. The paper concludes with discussion of the 
ethical implications of epistemic injustice for patients with CFS/ME, including 
recommendations for how health professionals and patients might reduce the risk of 
epistemic injustice. We end by suggesting that if epistemic justice is a professional 
virtue of health care professionals, and required for the exercise of other medical-
professional duties and virtues, then epistemic justice ought to be the focus of further 
reflection for professional ethical practice in health care and in particular in CFS/ME. 
 
2. CFS/ME: THE UNEXPLAINED, CONTESTED ILLNESS  
The aetiology and pathogenesis of CFS/ME remain unknown and there are no 
laboratory or diagnostic tests to identify sufferers and no known cures for CFS/ME.12 
While medical authorities recognize that CFS/ME exists, the lack of a specific and 
sensitive diagnostic test and clearly defined diagnostic criteria has hampered research 
on pathogenesis, treatment, and conceptualization of CFS/ME as a distinct entity.13  
 
Explanatory models of CFS/ME 
Two broad approaches to the aetiology of CFS/ME dominate current research: a 
biopsychosocial model (hereafter ‘BSP’) and biomedical theories of the illness.14 A 
number of prominent psychiatrists in the UK propose that CFS/ME is a multifaceted 
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illness which results from an interaction between biology, psychology, and social 
conditions. Theoretically, at least, on this BPS model, it is hypothesized that CFS/ME 
is the result of an (as yet unknown) biological vulnerability and/or trigger, but the 
illness may be perpetuated by abnormal illness beliefs with somatisation of bodily 
sensations among patients.15 Proponents of this model contend that cognitive 
behavioural therapy (CBT) is therapeutically important in helping patients to alter 
‘unhelpful illness beliefs’ and that graded exercise therapy (GET) may help to alter 
‘fear avoidance behaviours’ thereby progressively engaging patients in physical 
activities.15  
 Biomedical models of the illness include a wide range of theories including 
hypotheses that CFS/ME is a cellular level dysfunction, immune system disorder, 
muscular system disorder, an inflammatory condition, and/or a neurological 
dysfunction.16,17  
 
Ambiguities over psychological treatments 
To date, there is consensus among clinical researchers that no research programme 
has resulted in a cure for CFS/ME. However, unlike biomedical theories, the BPS 
model has led to treatment recommendations which have been endorsed in the UK by 
NICE and the NHS.18,19 Indeed, in the UK, in the last ten years health and government 
bodies have invested considerable sums into testing the effectiveness of CBT and 
GET treatments for CFS/ME. In 2011 the largest clinical trial in the UK on CFS/ME 
known as the ‘PACE Trial’iii (part-funded by the Department for Work and Pensions, 
the NHS, and the Medical Research Council) attracted almost five million pounds of 
funding, but the published results have been controversial. The PACE Trial compared 
                                                        
iii PACE stands for Pacing, graded Activity and Cognitive behaviour therapy: a randomised Evaluation. 
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CBT, GET, and pacing [pacing refers to “doing things within physical limits and not 
exerting oneself if one feels unwell”], versus standard medical care and reported a 
20%+ recovery rate with CBT-GET.20  
 This trial has faced a number of serious criticisms.21 Commentators have 
argued that ‘recovery’ did not mean return to full functional status and critics have 
pointed out that the positive results were not mirrored in so-called objective measures 
of functional ability (e.g. walking tests).22,23,24 Recently a Cochrane Review of 
psychotherapies, including CBT for functional syndromes concluded that there was 
only weak to moderate improvement outcomes for CFS/ME patients. 25 In September 
2016 concerns with the PACE trial culminated in a court tribunal which ruled that 
investigators must release trial data. The data released now shows that the previously 
published, purported benefits of CBT and GET have a much lower efficacy than 
previously thought.26 In addition to these concerns, the limited (and so far, 
controversial) outcomes of the trial have not yet been successfully replicated.22 
Finally, some very recent reviews conclude that CBT and GET may be harmful, 
exacerbating symptoms of CFS/ME.iv,23,24 
 In the UK, NICE and NHS guidelines reflect the unknown causes of CFS/ME, 
and the ambiguities about treatment options.18,19 For example, among other advice, 
NICE asserts that, “Your healthcare professional should: recognize that your 
condition is real and how the symptoms are affecting you; give you information about 
CFS/ME, the treatments and care described in this information ...”18 Among a list of 
                                                        
iv A 2015 patient survey of 1428 patients conducted by the ME Association found that CBT had 
minimal impact on illness symptoms with 88 per cent of individuals reporting that GET had no positive 
impact or an adverse impact on symptoms. ME Association (May 2015) ‘ME/CFS/ME Illness 
Management Survey Results: No decisions about me without me’, Patient Survey, (Accessed 18 May 
2016). 
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advice on treatments – including CBT and GET – it notes that, “If you are offered 
CBT, it does not mean that your healthcare professionals think your symptoms are ‘in 
your head’”.18 Similarly, the NHS Choices website (providing information about 
illnesses and treatments) asserts that there is no known cause for CFS/ME, and that 
various theories have been proposed (including viral infections, problems with the 
immune system, and psychological causes).19 The NHS further advises that, “an 
individual programme of treatment should be offered to you”, and again lists CBT 
and GET as possible treatments.19 It asserts, for example, that CBT may help patients 
to “manage CFS/ME by changing the way [you] think and behave”, emphasizing that 
“The use of CBT doesn’t mean that CFS/ME is considered to be a psychological 
condition”.19 This advice seems to advocate psychological treatment as well as 
acknowledging the somatic nature of CFS/ME. 
 
Explanations for patient dissatisfaction 
The previous two sections gave a brief overview of the current clinical state of the art 
knowledge of CFS/ME. We now provide an account of how aetiological and 
nosological uncertainties about the condition negatively affect judgments of CFS/ME 
patients, ultimately providing the basis for epistemic injustice. As we show, despite 
the relative evenhandedness of UK guidelines in their conceptualization of CFS/ME, 
some research has emphasized an explicit schism between patient advocacy groups 
and medical authorities over how to conceive CFS/ME.8,27,28 For example, in a recent 
literature review, Hossenbaccus and White argued that patient groups and medical 
authorities in the UK differ considerably in their attitudes towards CFS/ME.28 Using a 
content analysis of newspaper articles, ME [CFS/ME] patient organization websites, 
and medical websites, textbooks and selected articles, they found that, “89 per cent of 
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patient groups considered the illness to be physical […] compared with 24% of 
medical authorities”.28 Like other researchers, they contend that this discrepancy in 
views leads to disagreement in medical encounters, and in turn, this disagreement 
causes patient dissatisfaction.8,28,29,30  
 We identify three problems with the methodology in this study. First, the 
content analysis of “medical authorities” in Hossenbaccus and White’s survey is over-
inclusive.28 Their study goes beyond NICE and NHS guidelines to include text books, 
and selected “recommended reading lists” (articles). However, the literature classified 
under the rubric “medical authorities” is arguably vulnerable to selection bias since 
the recommended reading lists were obtained from the hospitals in which the authors 
taught (St. Bart’s and the London Medical School) and it is at least conceivable that 
the lists may have been weighted more heavily in favour of BPS models of CFS/ME. 
Second, perhaps more substantially, it is unclear what this literature review 
shows about disagreement: as we have seen, the symptomatology of CFS/ME often 
includes both physical and cognitive dysfunctions (including, for example, impaired 
memory) and there is consensus in NICE and NHS guidelines in the UK that the 
causes of CFS/ME remain a mystery, and that there is no agreed explanatory model 
for the illness.18,19 Thus, it is unclear whether the literature review reflects differences 
in beliefs with respect to physical versus mental symptoms, differences in 
explanations for the causes of the illness, or differences with respect to the treatment 
level (including, perhaps, its effectiveness). While there may indeed be substantial 
differences between patient groups and doctors, the review methodology is too 
coarse-grained to form the basis for firm conclusions.  
 Third, while it may be the case that some (perhaps even many) patients and 
doctors in fact disagree over explicit conceptualizations of CFS/ME, we contend that 
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the causes of patient dissatisfaction are likely to be subtler and more complex than a 
straightforward intellectual or taxonomical dispute.v Instead, we explore the claim 
that patient dissatisfaction may arise from: (i) the implicit and explicit negative 
stereotyping of patients leading to the downgrading of patient reports on their 
condition (what Fricker calls ‘testimonial injustice’); and (ii) conceptual 
impoverishment about CFS/ME within healthcare, giving rise to a lack of a 
framework within which to account for CFS/ME (which Fricker terms ‘hermeneutical 
injustice’).9 In the remainder of the paper we develop these two claims. Before we do 
that, it is necessary to examine Fricker’s account of epistemic injustice in more detail. 
 
3. EPISTEMIC INJUSTICE 
The notion of epistemic injustice points to a specific kind of injustice done to 
someone in their capacity as a knower, i.e. unfair treatment which takes place in the 
context of distinctively epistemic practices and activities.9 Fricker suggests two 
foundational kinds of discriminative epistemic injustice, testimonial and 
hermeneutical, which are discussed below. Before we turn to these, it is important to 
note that subsequent work by Fricker and others has identified many sub-forms within 
the two kinds of epistemic injustice, testimonial and hermeneutical. We do not discuss 
these in detail here, but direct the reader to Kidd, Medina and Pohlhaus (in press). 
 
Testimonial Injustice 
Fricker proposes that testimonial injustice occurs when a speaker is unfairly accorded 
a lower level of credibility as a result of prejudice—centrally, prejudice concerning 
                                                        
v Indeed, we argue that should any such intellectual disagreement in fact be a direct source of patient 
dissatisfaction, this also necessitates further investigation since it suggests that medical 
communication and disclosure within the consultation may be failing, and potentially leading to 
patient harm. 
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their membership of a negatively stereotyped group. In such circumstances, a listener 
(implicitly and/or explicitly) interprets the speaker to have a diminished capacity qua 
testifier and bearer of knowledge (for example, they may view the speaker as 
untrustworthy or unreliable due to prejudice). The result is that the speaker’s 
contribution to the shared epistemic enterprise is unjustly excluded, dismissed, or 
relegated to a lower status as a result of negative stereotyping associated with some of 
the speaker’s characteristics (e.g. race, accent, age, gender, disability.). It is important 
to note that testimonial injustice can occur both to those who are or who are perceived 
as being members of such groups. Fricker claims that the individual suffers not only 
an epistemic insult or injustice, but that since the discrediting occurs in a social arena, 
the individual is also thereby dehumanized – degraded as a contributor of knowledge. 
She argues, “a speaker suffers testimonial injustice just if prejudice on the hearer’s 
part causes him to give the speaker less credibility than he would otherwise have 
given”.9 
 A growing body of work has suggested that individuals suffering from ill 
health are more vulnerable to testimonial injustice, and this vulnerability exists across 
the different stages and epistemic practices of medical work.10,11, 31, 32, 33 There is a 
risk of testimonial injustice when, for example, the inadvertent negative stereotyping 
of an illness or disability (on the part of a health professional) constrains the patient’s 
epistemic contribution to consultations, and wider conversations, about their condition.  
 It is important to emphasize that we do not object to the justified level of 
epistemic privilege that individuals (such as health care professionals) have owed to 
their training. Rather, we propose that patients (and other marginalized groups and 
individuals) have a different kind of epistemic privilege which also deserves to be 
recognized and respected. As Carel has argued, conceptions of the lived experience of 
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chronic illness are underrepresented in health care theory and practice in ways that 
can unfairly obscure certain forms of epistemic privilege that patients might possess.34 
Respect for multiple domains of knowledge ensures a collaborative working 
relationship in healthcare encounters. Moreover, there is also scope for transgression 
of these boundaries: patients can be experts in their own condition (e.g. researching 
clinical trials of treatments, the causes of their illness, and so on); and doctors may 
have deep personal insights into illness experiences.35,36 Injustice arises with respect 
to epistemic privilege when one group fails to recognize the unique expertise of 
another group, or when an individual fails to fully appreciate the epistemic 
contributions of another individual.  
 In summation: in the medical context, unwarranted epistemic privilege can be 
accorded to either group (health professionals and patients); however, it is patients 
who have most to lose from the effects of such epistemic skewing. We do not claim 
that all ill persons are de facto epistemically reliable, but that negative stereotypes 
attached to illness give rise to certain biases about ill people, which make them more 
vulnerable to epistemic injustice (see Kidd & Carel). Certain illnesses may impair the 
cognitive judgments and insights of patients (e.g. dementia, psychoses, or certain 
brain injuries). It is certainly true that patients may dispute medical facts on ill-judged 
grounds; yet, even in such cases the patient may be vulnerable to epistemic injustice. 
This is because judgments about credibility are elicited and sustained by prejudicial 
stereotypes. The systematic undermining of patient testimony, “can lead to a vicious 
circle of increasing frustration, leading to more extreme styles of expression, which in 
turn lead to further epistemic disenfranchisement”.11  
 
Hermeneutical Injustice 
 13 
Whereas testimonial injustice is perpetrated by individuals, Fricker defines 
hermeneutical injustice as a collective shortfall in our shared conceptual resources: in 
this way she defines hermeneutical injustice as a structural problem.9 Hermeneutic 
practice (making sense of our own and others’ social experiences) are fundamental to 
our social life and requires access to relevant resources (e.g. concepts, ideas, 
narratives). Hermeneutical injustice takes place when those resources are absent or 
impoverished or when one cannot fairly access them: it can be characterized as a 
failure by the members of one or more social groups to employ or to develop the 
shared hermeneutical resources necessary for mutual understanding of some set of 
distinctive social experiences. Fricker contends that hermeneutic injustice takes place 
when “both speaker and hearer are laboring under the same inadequate tools”.9 For 
Fricker, such hermeneutical shortcomings may impinge asymmetrically on particular 
groups of people negatively affecting one group yet often conferring an advantage on 
another group. Hermeneutical injustice occurs when hermeneutic resources are absent 
or impoverished, but it can also arise when such resources not respected and/or 
ignored by members of other social groups.vi 
 Fricker uses the example of sexual harassment in an era when the labeling (the 
very conceptualization of such occurrences as abuse) was either uncommon or simply 
did not occur: the upshot was that victims struggled to interpret, comprehend and 
articulate their experiences.9 She contends that this kind of conceptual 
impoverishment is more likely to affect members of marginalized or oppressed groups, 
and amounts to a “cognitive disadvantage”.9 The collective conceptual gap occurs 
because marginalized individuals have unequal access to the arena of shared, social 
                                                        
vi We thank an anonymous reviewer for providing clarification on this point. 
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interpretation. In the case of sexual harassment, there may even be a sense in which 
conceptual inarticulacy on the part of the victim suits the purposes of the perpetrator.  
  In the healthcare context, hermeneutical practices play a significant role. They 
enable sense-making reflective activity on the part of patients, helping to turn a 
bewildering and frightening set of symptoms into an understandable illness, often 
with an aetiological explanation and a treatment protocol. Other practices support 
other kinds of medical activity, such as supporting patients in self-management of 
chronic illness, understanding issues around noncompliance and physician mistrust, 
and of course the epistemic labour involved in providing a diagnosis. Thus the 
hermeneutical resources relevant to health care and illness are having concepts of 
health, illness and disease, positioning illness narratives within a social context, and 
enabling an interpretation of negative bodily experiences, such as pain. Hermeneutical 
injustice can lead to lack of resources in researching and treating patients with 
particular illnesses or disabilities; it can also result in inferior interpersonal care of 
Wewewe recognized or classified; but in other cases, the marginalized group may 
recognize their disadvantage, and discern their systematic exclusion from formal 
medical discourse and medical and policy decision making. A salient and tragic case 
is that of AIDS research in the 1980s, which was delayed and obstructed by the 
Republican government’s refusal to recognize the medical urgency and legitimacy of 
AIDS sufferers’ complaints.37 
Kidd and Carel describe two kinds of strategies that may underpin 
hermeneutical injustice. It should be pointed out that these strategies refer to social 
and epistemic practices, and are thereby neutral in respect to whether such practices 
arise from conscious intention or unconscious bias. ‘Strategies of exclusion’  “take the 
form of excluding a currently hermeneutically marginalized group from the practices 
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and places where social meanings are made and legitimated, such as professional 
committees or legislative bodies”.11 (Kidd & Carel 2016 p.12). Such exclusion can 
range “from physical exclusion to subtler forms of epistemic exclusion, such as the 
procedural insistence upon the employment of strenuous legal, medical, or academic 
terminologies and conventions, so as to exclude those who are not members of those 
groups from participating in deliberative processes” (ibid., p.12). In such cases, as 
Kidd and Carel point out, the ill persons may be able to describe their experiences of 
illness (typically in non-expert terms) but, “such experiences are: (a) largely 
considered inappropriate for public discussion and (b) play little or no role in clinical 
decision-making”.11  
Marginalized groups may also be subject to ‘strategies of expression’ in which 
their particular forms of expression are taken as evidence of the group’s lack of 
rationality and lack of understanding of the modes of expression that are recognized 
as appropriate by the dominant group. Here a form of expression that a marginalized 
group “uses in its efforts to make the case for the recognition of its hermeneutical 
resources can serve to undermine those very efforts. And this can lead to a vicious 
circle of increasing frustration, leading to more extreme styles of expression, which in 
turn lead to further epistemic disenfranchisement” (Kidd & Carel 2016 p.13). 
 The mobilization of these two strategies results in an epistemic insult towards 
the speaker, who is not perceived as “fully rational”9 and imposes a double injury on 
the patient: the patient is marginalized for her testimony when that testimony involves 
a degree of inarticulacy. Patients are also excluded from engagement in the activities 
that would help enhance knowledge of their illness, and which could improve 
articulacy of the illness experience. In this way, hermeneutical injustice (exclusion 
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from the structural processes of knowledge formation) may also intensify testimonial 
injustice and vice versa.  
 
4. USING EPISTEMIC INJUSTICE TO UNDERSTAND CFS/ME 
SUFFERERS’ EXPERIENCES 
Analysis of the scope of epistemic injustice among CFS/ME patients is intrinsically 
fraught with difficulties. For example, some patients may not be aware they have been 
the victims of negative stereotyping and testimonial injustice (perhaps they expect the 
medical profession to assume a paternalistic tone, or are embarrassed to admit this in 
surveys). Alternatively, some patients may not realize they have been victims of 
hermeneutical injustice simply because they have failed to receive a diagnosis of 
CFS/ME. Perhaps we can generalize and suggest that a speaker will not be able to 
recognize fully that they have been a victim of epistemic injustice until they have the 
concept in hand. Nonetheless, from the 1980s to the present day, there have been a 
number of qualitative and quantitative studies which provide foundational research 
about healthcare professionals’ and patients’ attitudes to CFS/ME. In this section we 
examine how empirical findings support the epistemic injustice framework we 
propose, and suggest that these findings show that CFS/ME is negatively stereotyped 
in ways that introduce unjust credibility deficits. We also suggest that this framework 
can shed light on the high levels of dissatisfaction reported by CFS/ME patients.  
 It is worth reiterating that built into diagnostic descriptions by NICE and the 
NHS (to date) is an acknowledgement that the causes of CFS/ME are not yet 
understood, and treatments (where offered) may help to manage CFS/ME but there 
are no known cures for the illness. Formally at least, it would appear that conceptual 
resources for identifying and understanding CFS/ME are in place in mainstream 
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healthcare (even in spite of ongoing controversies into the evidence-base for CBT and 
GET); although where conceptual resources are absent or ambiguous this may point 
to a possible source of hermeneutical injustice.  We also seek to identify other sources 
of hermeneutical injustice and of testimonial injustice, as each has distinct sources 
and forms and it is important not to conflate them. 
 
Evidence from the medical community 
Despite official medical guidelines, a range of studies appear to suggest that GPs 
struggle to recognize the legitimacy of CFS/ME. Surveys of GPs in the UK reveal a 
significant degree of skepticism about CFS/ME. In one survey only half the 
respondents believed that CFS/ME was a real illness.38 This degree of skepticism 
towards the existence of the condition could lead to testimonial injustice because 
patient reports would not be seen to have a genuine medical cause. It could also lead 
to hermeneutical injustice because patient complaints may not be interpreted as 
cohering into a set of recognized symptoms, nor given meaning as clustering around 
CFS/ME. 
In another survey (conducted in the same year, 2005) nearly 25% of doctors 
did not accept CFS/ME as a clinical entity, and of those who did nearly 50% were not 
confident about diagnosing patients.39 A UK study reports that diagnosis occurred 
after an average of six appointments.44 This data also supports the possibility of twin 
injustices, testimonial and hermeneutical, because the symptoms were not interpreted 
as part of a recognized condition, and a delay in diagnosis may point to reluctance to 
take the complaints seriously or to anchor them in CFS/ME. It is also possible that 
lack of confidence in diagnosing translates also into a lowered credibility assigned to 
patient reports, which can be another cause of testimonial injustice. 
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Surveys in other countries have revealed comparable findings: a recent 
Australian study found that nearly a third of GPs did not accept CFS/ME as a distinct 
syndrome;40 a recent survey in Belgium reported that patients suffering from CFS/ME 
waited an average of five years to receive a diagnosis.41 This research indicates that, 
even when faced with patients with CFS/ME, many doctors reject the illness category 
of CFS/ME, or require considerable time to reach a CFS/ME diagnosis, again 
supporting our suggestion that patient testimonies are not readily interpreted as arising 
from a recognized medical condition and are not acted upon decisively. It is important 
to note that the period prior to diagnosis may be fraught with suffering and symptom 
experience, which are exacerbated by the anxiety resulting from the uncertainty about 
the condition and the lack of diagnosis. Such a lengthy period may also negatively 
affect patients’ relationship with health professionals, as it may erode the trust they 
have in their knowledge and ability to help. 
 Qualitative research confirms these conceptual and hermeneutical deficits: a 
range of surveys conclude that negative stereotyping of patients with CFS/ME persists 
among doctors.8,29,40,42,43 For example, a study by Raine et al. (2004) concluded that 
there are mixed attitudes about CFS/ME among GPs; some doctors claimed that they 
would, “Do anything for these patients” while others described CFS/ME patients 
pejoratively as “heartsinky” and a “burden”.44 This indicates a negative stereotyping 
of such patients, and may lead to testimonies from patients being so-described and/or 
met with doubt. A recent study of GPs by Chew-Graham et al. documented comments 
such as: “‘I thought it was people sort of passively giving into symptoms and just sort 
of saying ‘right that’s it’ and giving up.”30 This study also revealed that many doctors 
believe a diagnosis of CFS/ME is inherently problematic: “Once you start labeling a 
patient if you’re not careful you might have a self-fulfilling prophecy”.30 Cross-
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cultural research also shows that doctors who accept CFS/ME as a real clinical 
syndrome or disease are 2.5 times more likely to enjoy working with CFS/ME 
patients.30,33,45 
 In the UK the most common treatment provided by GPs surveyed was 
antidepressant therapy (84%): whether this indicated a tendency to psychologize 
symptoms and the treatment of CFS/ME, or whether the majority of patients 
presenting with CFS/ME exhibited comorbidity with depression is underdetermined.44 
However, Raine et al. found that in cases where doctors ascribed to a BPS model of 
CFS/ME some doctors were, “not motivated to shift responsibility for management to 
other professionals; patients were able to manage themselves with ‘their own cack-
handed CBT’”.44 Such reports indicate a level of negative stereotyping among GPs 
who otherwise appeared to have awareness of the illness. We suggest that such 
negative stereotyping can lead to testimonial injustice and also to ‘strategies of 
expression’ that label such patients as ‘moaners’ or depressed.  
This is supported by the study by Chew-Graham et al. which found that GPs 
queried the value of referral as unnecessary and even harmful.30 Of particular note, 
the GPs surveyed in this study were part of the FINE trial on CFS/ME and therefore 
(presumably) had prior knowledge of CFS/ME that may have exceeded that of other 
doctors.30 This again indicates a degree of disbelief about the reality of the condition, 
which may give rise to both testimonial and hermeneutic injustice. 
 The failure to conceive of CFS/ME as a legitimate illness classification was 
also reported in the only study among students conducted in the UK at University of 
Manchester’s School of Medicine (2015).27 Stenhoff et al. reported that students have, 
“limited knowledge but many opinions” with many students’ knowledge restricted to 
CFS/ME as mere ‘tiredness’.27 This study also found that negative attitudes were 
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explicitly expressed by trainee doctors illustrating how testimonial injustice may not 
only be a real risk in this group, but may also engender hermeneutical gaps: “[…]‘you 
think god they are just knackered […] like everyone gets knackered no-one really 
cares’”.27 Indeed, all the students surveyed in this study reported that they had 
received no training in CFS/ME – that it was “brushed under the rug”.27 Some 
students expressed the sentiment that if it had been included it would have been “a 
wasted week”; while others felt the condition was too rare, complex, or unclear to 
warrant inclusion in the medical curriculum.27,vii Some students offered psychiatric 
explanations for CFS/ME, psychologizing the causes of CFS/ME, perhaps 
instinctually filling in a gap in learning.27 In these responses we can see echoes of the 
negative stereotyping identified amongst physicians, demonstrating the pervasiveness 
of such stereotyping and hence its putative pervasive effect on their judgments and 
decisions. This study echoed the finding among doctors that personal knowledge of 
someone with CFS/ME is a positive determinant in enhancing medics’ attitudes 
towards patients and the legitimacy of the illness: in this respect, personal encounters 
with patients appear to partly fill the apparent lacunae in medical education.  
 The conclusion we draw, based on interviews and studies among doctors and 
medical students, is that patients with CFS/ME are especially vulnerable to both 
testimonial and hermeneutical injustice. Insofar as these studies are to be relied upon, 
there is conceptual ambiguity among doctors about diagnosing and treating CFS/ME 
and as we suggest, this may give rise to reduced patient credibility, slower and more 
tentative reactions of medical staff, refusal to refer to specialist clinics, and delayed 
diagnosis. It may also lead to hermeneutic injustice as patient interpretations of their 
                                                        
vii Others claimed these attitudes were transmitted by medical educators and doctors (“I have spoken 
to doctors in hospital […] they just say it’s bullshit […] that it’s a made up thing’ […]; ‘GPs will kind of 
make […] comments about how it’s just […] people are lazy”). 
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symptoms may be rejected due to disbelief in the reality of the condition. CFS/ME 
may be a particularly difficult condition to diagnose; however, evidence of delays in 
diagnosis among patients also indicates a hermeneutical gap in the state of medical 
education, training and practice.   
 
Evidence from patients 
The evidence for this hermeneutical gap, including the cross cultural findings that 
significant percentages of doctors continue to ignore or deny the legitimacy of 
CFS/ME as an illness, is supported by studies of patient experience. For example, a 
survey in Belgium found that most of the randomly sampled patients surveyed (84 per 
cent) reported that their GP needed more education on CFS/ME, with half of patients 
changing doctors to seek better treatment.41 This is a natural response to one’s sense 
that their testimony is devalued and disbelieved: the patient thereby seeks someone 
else to tell their problems to and obtain help from. If strategies for exclusion were not 
in place, there would be a better exchange between patients and GPs with further 
opportunities for GPs to understand the condition and the concepts and ideas through 
which sufferers interpret it. 
A number of cross-cultural studies provide robust evidence of testimonial 
injustice: patients with CFS/ME still experience heavy stigmatization, including by 
health professionals. For example, the study conducted in Sweden by Asbring et al. 
found that many patients experienced their moral character being questioned, and that 
this was perceived to be more burdensome than the illness itself: “[t]hat one is not 
believed […] it is so hard that it is almost the worst thing.”45 In addition, the 
perception of malingering and even the feeling of “police interrogation” during 
consultations, including the need to defend the experience of illness, were common; 
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only a minority of patients did not report implicit or explicit expressions of suspicion 
by health professionals.45 In light of this, perhaps a better explanation for the strength 
of feeling among advocacy groups is that a significant number of patients feel the 
need to express their epistemic concerns and have a distinctive sense of, perhaps 
unarticulated but nonetheless robust, epistemic injustice. As Carel and Kidd have 
argued, online blogs and patient fora provide individuals with the platform to “attest 
to persistent experiences of feeling ignored, marginalized, or epistemically excluded 
by health professionals” [pp.529-530]. 
With regard to furnishing patients with information on CFS/ME, a study by 
Thomas and Smith found that only 14.8% of UK surgeries provided literature on 
CFS/ME (supplied, for the most part, by the ME Association).38 An extensive 
Swedish study revealed a tendency among doctors to psychologize patient symptoms, 
and while many patients in the study did not object to discussing psychological causes 
(perhaps also adhering to a BPS model of CFS/ME), the occurrence of implicit 
psychologizing when the health professional did not explicitly disclose their preferred 
explanation for CFS/ME, was considered by patients to be condescending and 
undermining.39 This finding supports Fricker’s contention that negatively-stereotyped 
patients may thereby find themselves “excluded from trustful conversation”.9 It is also 
an instance of exclusion, whereby the interpretation of the condition and its causes 
excluded the patients’ preferred explanation. 
 Raine et al. report that some GPs considered patients with CFS/ME to be 
“adversarial”;44 these doctors reportedly considered patients who rejected their views 
on the causation of CFS/ME to challenge their medical authority, and may have led 
them to employ strategies of exclusion. The authors concluded that “both doctor and 
patient seemed to violate their expected roles,” and that doctors’ stereotyping of 
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patients with CFS/ME “meant that the condition ceased to be seen as a discrete 
disorder and became the defining feature of that patient”.44 However, deferring to 
‘expected roles’ can on its own be epistemically unjust – for example, if the roles in 
question are ‘authoritative doctor’ and ‘submissive patient’. Also, complaints about 
adversarial modes of engagement might be seen as ‘strategies of expression’ (patients 
being perceived as ‘irrational’). If patients are being too assertive, they are failing to 
adopt an acceptable style of expression, so what they are offering will be excluded, 
thus perpetuating gaps in shared hermeneutical resources.  
This findings of this study contrast with the conclusion of the Hossenbaccus 
and White paper [pp.7-8] which argues that extensive patient dissatisfaction arises 
from a clash over how to conceive CFS/ME among patients and doctors.28 The 
implication of the Hossenbaccus and White paper is that some CFS/ME patients 
simply are disagreeable and adversarial due to their dissent from medical opinion; 
such patients may be construed as displaying a level of epistemic autonomy 
unacceptable to physicians, in the request for a particular interpretation of their illness. 
Such a struggle over hermeneutical resources and the right to declare a cause for the 
condition is an instance of strategies of exclusion, in which, again, patients’ 
interpretations play no role in the diagnostic and clinical process. 
However, in light of the foregoing evidence of negative stereotyping, and the 
lack of consensus within medicine about how to explain CFS/ME, we argue that 
medical doctors who espouse a BPS model are not thereby entitled to stake a claim of 
incontestable epistemic privilege. Their favoured interpretation excludes alternative 
interpretations in ways which may amount to hermeneutical injustice towards the 
patients contesting this interpretation. Such exclusion strategies, where they occur, are 
indicative of both testimonial and hermeneutical injustice: the patient may feel 
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belittled or even maligned for voicing a different (and, given the state of research, 
plausible) viewpoint, and his or her testimony may be minimized, interpreted as a 
symptom of, say, depression, or entirely disregarded. We suggest that gaps in relevant 
shared resources are being subjected to strategies of exclusion, whereby physicians 
are refusing to heed calls on them to enrich their conceptual resources or to engage in 
debate about the enrichment of these resources. The psychologizing of patients’ 
complaints evidenced above, is an example of such exclusion; offerings of 
testimonies and interpretations about somatic suffering is reduced to psychological 
complaint, thus obviating the need to directly engage with the somatic symptoms.10 
 Evidence of patients’ experiences with psychotherapists corroborates these 
findings. A British study of client-centered therapy is particularly illuminating 
because it documents the anonymized views of patients in non-directive therapy, a 
version of therapy in which patients direct the sessions according to their own 
perceived problems and experiences, setting the agenda for dialogue. The study 
reported that the issue which was identified and discussed most in conversations 
between CFS/ME patients and therapists was, “the difficulties in relating to others due 
to misunderstandings of, and attitudes about ME [CFS/ME]”.46 In addition clients 
reported “anger due to the way in which relatives had reacted”.46 This anger and 
frustration may fuel the style of expression such patients adopt and eventually lead to 
‘strategies of expression’-based hermeneutic and testimonial injustices as patient 
attempts at communication become more fraught and angry, thus making their 
expression less accessible to others. 
 
Summary 
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In this paper we have argued that CFS/ME patients are negatively stereotyped and 
unfairly prevented from making sense of their experiences. This then deflates their 
credibility and undermines their hermeneutic and communicative efforts. We 
suggested that this effect can be articulated using the concept of epistemic injustice, 
and provided such an analysis, highlighting the ways in which evidence and patient 
and physician testimonies can reveal the operation of both hermeneutic and 
testimonial injustices.  
Even the most modest conclusion based on these findings supports the claim that 
negative stereotyping of patients suffering from CFS/ME still persists in many 
healthcare encounters and more broadly in society. We therefore suggest that, as the 
above discussion shows, these negative stereotypes make CFS/ME patients more 
vulnerable to both testimonial and hermeneutical injustice, in the ways described 
above. We emphasize that research shows that the experiences of patients, and the 
attitudes of health professionals, is mixed; nonetheless, we conclude that testimonial 
injustice – the deflation of CFS/ME patients’ testimony on the ground of unjustified 
negative stereotyping – appears to be a continued problem within mainstream 
healthcare across a range of settings and countries. Furthermore, it would seem that 
the testimonial injustice is sustained and also accompanied by hermeneutical injustice 
because the dominant group (health professionals) may routinely fail to provide 
adequate training about CFS/ME, leading to prejudiced deflations of patient 
credibility, and/or an unfair lack of shared concepts with which to make mutual sense 
of the experience of the patient.  
 
5. EPISTEMIC INJUSTICE LEADS TO PATIENT HARM 
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Consultations whereby patient testimony is discredited, or otherwise marginalised or 
ignored, or where patients’ contributions to meaningful dialogue are excluded, risk 
undermining diagnostic accuracy and provision of adequate treatment. In the worst 
case this can lead to isolation, confusion and patient withdrawal from the healthcare 
system. Patients who feel that they are disbelieved, mistrusted and treated with 
suspicion may choose to withdraw contact with health professionals altogether. A 
study conducted in Belgium by Van Hoof revealed that there is a lack of ongoing 
professional development and disbelief among doctors that CFS/ME is real, and that 
this, in turn leads to inferior communication and management of the condition among 
patients.41 Furthermore, medical “ambivalence about treatment options” has been 
directly attributed to the breakdown in the relationship between doctor and patient.41 
Research reveals that the earlier the diagnosis of CFS/ME, the better the 
prognosis;41,47,48 the failure to diagnose CFS/ME is cited as a direct cause of lack of 
empathy in primary care.41 
 The continued psychologizing of patients’ problems is a complex issue in 
CFS/ME. Given that no psychological-level or biological-level causal factors have 
been identified, research into psychological therapies remains controversial. Indeed, 
there is evidence that some patients with CFS/ME are excluded from full disclosure 
about the rationale for psychological treatments suggesting that CFS/ME patients may 
be perceived as, in some sense, epistemically immature, or incapacitated when it 
comes to autonomous decision-making:44 one UK study of patient experiences with 
psychotherapy reported that most patients were unaware which form of therapy they 
had undergone (only one in three were clear that they had received CBT).37 While it is 
at least conceivable that lack of disclosure is a common experience among all 
psychotherapy patients, in the case of clearly defined mental health issues the 
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rationale for therapy must at least be understandable to clients.49,50,51 Yet studies 
reveal that patients with CFS/ME report mixed feelings about psychotherapy: while 
some patients find sessions helpful in countering engulfing depressive feelings about 
their illness, others have reported sessions as “very patronizing and negative” with the 
perception that they were being “blamed” for their ongoing illness.37  
 It is therefore not surprising that one British survey estimates that as many as 
two thirds of CFS/ME patients are dissatisfied with the quality of care they have 
experienced.8 This conclusion is consistent with a number of studies that found that 
negative stereotyping acts as a barrier to successful support for the patient52,53 leading 
to a “vicious spiral of alienation between doctor and patient”.44 
 When patients perceive negative attitudes from health professionals this risks 
their trust and confidence in services. Patients surveyed in qualitative studies reported 
adopting social distancing and concealing strategies to avoid stigmatization by 
others39 – to preserve what Goffman referred to as ‘the presentation of self in 
everyday life’.54 Some patients even reported withdrawal from health professionals 
(in particular doctors) in order to avoid “feeling as though they were called into 
question or violated in another way”; while significant numbers of patients changed 
doctors in order to avoid being labeled a problem patient.39 
  
6. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
There are deep differences between patients and health professionals in 
conceptualizing CFS/ME. In extreme cases, the differences amount to an epistemic 
gulf between health professionals who do not believe in the existence of CFS/ME, 
and patients who experience distressing and debilitating symptoms. Our first 
recommendation is that even if patients are committed to the idea that their illness has 
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a physical basis, and health professionals think otherwise, the professionals ought to 
find ways to work with this conceptualization to ensure that patients feel listened to, 
rather than use the consultation as a forum for ‘correcting’ or disputing fundamental 
aetiological factors of CFS/ME.37 
Secondly, medical education clearly has a role to play in improving health 
professionals’ knowledge and attitudes about CFS/ME. A recent study of medical 
students in the UK found that, like qualified GPs, the students appeared to struggle 
with a classification that had no known cause: without a known biomedical 
framework, students articulated the view that the illness wasn’t real.26 We thus 
suggest that CFS/ME and other conditions that are currently medically unexplained 
ought to be addressed clearly in medical teaching and training. It is estimated that 
around 20% of GP visits are triggered by medically unexplained symptoms (MUS).55 
Such a significant proportion merits both attention and specialist training to ensure 
that patients presenting with MUS have their needs met and that health professionals 
refer appropriately and involve other agencies as needed, rather than committing 
epistemic injustice by dismissing the complaints. Such training would also combat the 
sense of helplessness that such consultations may give rise to in both patients and 
health professionals.viii 
We strongly believe that recognition of epistemic injustice, and having 
philosophical tools with which to articulate it, are a first step towards the future 
                                                        
viii One recommendation is to consider using Carel’s phenomenological toolkit which can support 
mixed groups of patients and health professionals in their attempt to discern and express the 
experience of CFS/ME. The toolkit was developed in order to support patients in their goal of 
reflecting on and expressing their illness experience (see: Carel H (2013). Illness, 
phenomenology, and philosophical method, Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 34(4):345-57). 
The toolkit (and similar reflective practices) may improve communication between CFS/ME 
patients and health professionals because patients may be better able to articulate their 
experiences and thereby be more effective contributors to their care. Similarly, health 
professionals may gain a more nuanced grasp of CFS/ME experience, as well as honing their 
epistemic sensibilities and skills, such as listening to and understanding multiple perspectives.  
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abolition and prevention of such injustice recurring. We therefore suggest that further 
reflection is sought on the issue of how CFS/ME patients are communicated with, and 
treated.  
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